Depreciating evidence in administrative adjudication: Rules on the sequence to present evidences by Avdasheva, Svetlana B. & Shastitko, Andrey E.
© Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет, 2018
2018 ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА Т. 34. Вып. 4
ЭКОНОМИКА
496 https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu05.2018.401 
ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ТЕОРИЯ 
В ИСТОРИЧЕСКОМ РАЗВИТИИ
JEL: K21, K41
Depreciating evidence in administrative adjudication: 
Rules on the sequence to present evidences*
S. B. Avdasheva1, A. E. Shastitko2,3
1 National Research University Higher School of Economics, 
20, Myasnitskaya ul., Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation
2 Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, 
 82-1, Vernadskogo, Moscow, 119571, Russian Federation
3 Moscow Lomonosov State University, 
1-46, Leninskiye Gory, Moscow, 119991, Russian Federatoion
For citation: Avdasheva S. B., Shastitko A. E. Depreciating evidence in administrative adjudication: 
Rules on the sequence to present evidences. St Petersburg University Journal of Economic Studies, 2018, 
vol. 34, issue 4, pp. 496–510. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu05.2018.401
The late choice of the type of alleged infringement in administrative investigations, when 
company (alleged infringer) presents evidence first and then responsible agency decides on 
the content of infringement on the basis of evidence produced by company has significant 
incentive effect. This rule demotivates alleged infringers to present evidence under the proce-
dure of administrative inspection in time and as complete as possible. In addition, incentives 
to provide evidence are limited if the agency has the opportunity to select among different 
types of alleged infringement and to use evidence presented by company in its favor as evi-
dence of a certain type of alleged infringement. Time sequencing of decisions when the choice 
of the type of infringement is made just after agency collects evidence from company inevi-
tably results in decisionsof infringement, which company then appeals in the court. The ex-
perience of Russian antitrust investigations — with two indicative illustrations (Novolipetsky 
metallurgical plant case and the case with largest Russian retailers specialized in computers 
and home electronics) shows the importance for the company of being suspected in certain 
infringement to decide on the amount of evidence. Incentives to provide evidence are studied 
through the lens of all-pay auction framework to explaining the effects of procedural rules in 
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administrative enforcement that is inquisitorial in nature, in contrast to adversarial ones. It is 
shown that prosecutorial bias or asymmetric burden of proof is not necessary to suppress the 
incentives of the target of investigation to produce evidence.  
Keywords: administrative enforcement, investigation, prosecution, adjudication, evidence.
1. Introduction
Efficient enforcement of legislation requires correct distinction between legal and 
illegal behavior, or high discriminatory power [Kaplow, 1994; Katsoulacos, Ulph, 2016].
In turn, proper evidence is necessary to make right conclusions. There are many 
legislative acts, enforcement areas (for the authors, nearest example is antitrust) where 
necessary evidence goes far beyond “naked” data and its consistent interpretation in the 
non-contradictory framework is required [Neven, 2006; Schinkel, 2007]. 
However, for antitrust enforcement the difference between data/information, on 
the one hand, and economic evidence, on the other, is the most visible, for cases de-
cided according to the “effect-based’’ or the “rule-of-reason’’ approach [Neven,2006; 
Katsoulacos, Ulph, 2016]. In order to assess behavior properly consistent explanation 
of reasons and effects of business practice under consideration is necessary in contrast 
to “pure data”. 
Therefore, incentives of the parties of investigation of supposed law violation are of 
crucial importance. At first glance, incentives of the parties to provide evidence under 
investigation are self-apparent. The goal of the investigator who is the responsible agency 
is to prevent consumer welfare loss (or social welfare loss, depending on the welfare stand-
ard of enforcement established). The goal of the company is to avoid infringement deci-
sion with monetary sanctions and remedies. 
However, besides the gains of the party (company), the rules of decision making influ-
ence the incentives to collect and to provide evidence in support of legal position. Among 
other procedural rules, time schedule of presenting evidence is important. There are cir-
cumstances when at the time of provision of evidence to the investigator it is unclear if ad-
ditional evidence improves or disproves the position of the company under investigation. 
Effects of information provision are the most obscure and therefore the most crucial 
for the incentives of the parties when one authority collects evidence, investigate con-
ducts, prosecute and makes decision on his own — under so-called inquisitorial enforce-
ment model [Asimow, 2015], in antitrust also known as administrative enforcement, in 
contrast to prosecutorial one [Jenny, 2016].
In Russia, infringements of administrative law are decided normally according to 
inquisitorial procedure. Three steps are made by the authorities. First, there is preliminary 
analysis when agency staff provide a quick look of the case and makes so-called “front-
line” decision. Second, basing on “front-line” decision agency allows the alleged infringer 
to present the case, to provide the evidence and challenge the “front-line” hypothesis of 
administrative staff. Third, administrative reconsideration is possible, when party has a 
right to claim for challenging the decision by higher-level personnel. These three steps 
within the enforcement authority (under the common name of “Service” — e. g. Federal 
Tax Service, Federal Custom Service, Federal Antitrust, or Antimonopoly Service) are 
complemented by the possibility of judicial review in the Russian commercial courts as 
a fourth step. In the broad classification of administrative adjudication [Asimow, 2015], 
498 Вестник СПбГУ. Экономика. 2018. Т. 34. Вып. 4
Russian model of administrative adjudication is close to China, Argentina and Japan. The 
difference is that in contrast to European continental model, in Russia judicial review of 
administrative decisions covers not only procedural issues but also legal facts. Consider-
ing the claim to annul infringement decision of the administrative authority, courts can 
take into account new evidence, reasons, and arguments, and the court is empowered to 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency on factual and discretionary issues, as well 
as legal issues. The right to consider new evidence and establish new facts differentiates 
judicial review of administrative decision in Russia from power of courts, say, in US or 
UK, where courts consider only procedural issues under review. In terms of comparative 
analysis of adjudication [Asimow, 2015], Russian commercial courts provide open in con-
trast to closed review. In turn, difference from French or German system is that Russian 
commercial courts are not specialized on the claims to administrative authorities. 
Open judicial review (the right to acquire new evidence, reconsider evidence and 
establish new facts) in Russia provides unique opportunity to compare (or course, with 
some limitation) the outcomes of inquisitorial and adversarial procedures. Under the re-
view in commercial courts there are the same two parties, which are public enforcement 
agency and alleged infringer, and apparently the same case. The only important change is 
that procedure of consideration is adversarial not inquisitorial. However, the outcomes of 
the procedure under adversarial rules are often different. 
In 2017, Russian commercial courts considered several thousands claims to annul 
decisions on administrative penalties. Defendants are Federal Tax Service (2176 claims), 
Federal Custom Service (2516 claims) and Federal Antitrust Service (2320 claims). Out 
these claims, from 36 (Custom Service and Antitrust Service) to 45 % (Tax Service) are 
satisfied. In addition, there were 7309 claims to annul infringement decisions of the Fed-
eral Antitrust Service, from which 32 % are satisfied. Even taking into account that claims 
for annulment are different from the general population of the cases, and they are skewed 
in favor of the cases where evidence in favor of infringement decisions is weaker (see 
[Priest, Klein, 1994]), the share of wrong convictions made by services is very large.
This share hardly can be explained by accidental errors of particular public servants. 
Recall that in every service there is a system of administrative reconsideration that corrects 
the mistake by lower levels on the complaint. Most of claimants in commercial courts first 
provides claims to the unit responsible for reconsideration. Administrative reconsideration 
units obtain expertise in the area of law and at the same time anticipate claims to the courts 
in case of negative decision on the claim. Expectations on the high probability of judicial 
review should correct possible prosecutorial bias, common for administrative model of 
adjudication [Wils, 2004] at least on the level of administrative reconsideration unit.
One observation that partly explains difference in the outcomes of administrative 
adjudication on the level of agency and judicial review in commercial courts is different 
attitudes of the companies to the presentation of information to the authorities, on the one 
hand, and to commercial courts, on the other. On the stage of administrative investiga-
tion, from “front-line” analysis to administrative reconsideration, inspected companies 
often refrain from providing evidence, while on the stage of judicial review present large 
amount of evidence.
Our explanation is that typically announcement of the content of alleged violation 
takes place at the end of initial stage of investigation (inspection). At the initial stages 
company should provide information not being confident in the concrete type of infringe-
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ment alleged. Hence company does not know what kind of evidence supports its position 
in the best way. If the period of uncertainty about alleged infringement is long enough, 
during the whole period company is in disadvantage in comparison to the circumstances 
for presenting evidence when alleged infringement is defined with certainty. 
But it is not only company that is affected by the rules of evidence presentation. If the 
target company under administrative investigation, or inspection, presents little evidence 
in her favor, administrative authority makes decision with lower amount of evidenceun-
der lower standards of proof. As far as decision relies on the contest between the alterna-
tive economic evidence presented, limited evidence produced by one party (company) 
suppresses the incentives of the other (authority). Decreasing amount of evidence results 
in the increase of probability of wrong convictions. Observed outcome is the increasing 
share of annulment of administrative decision. 
The paper explains the negative impact that the sequence of information requests and 
information provision have on the incentives of the alleged infringer to produce economic 
evidence. Incentives of the company and antitrust authority are interpreted in the frame-
work of all-pay auctions, when evidence presented is considered as a “bid” in the contest 
for favorable decision. We analyze the effects of the company’s disadvantage during the 
time of producing evidence, for the illustrative purposes assuming the procedure to fol-
low the “reverse order” rule, when antitrust authority chooses and company recognizes 
alleged infringement after it provides economic evidence. Conceptual framework relies 
on the experience of Russian antitrust enforcement where procedures till now support the 
‘reverse order’ rule of evidence provision and alleged infringement recognition. We show 
that this rule can even be socially beneficial but only if any legal errors of the authority of 
competition are completely excluded. Otherwise, this rule is welfare-detrimental.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the experience of Russian compe-
tition law enforcement, which motivates the analysis of the effects of ‘time schedule’ (or steps 
sequencing) procedures. On the example of particular antitrust investigations, we show the 
roots of refraining to provide evidence. Section 3 briefly reviews understandings of legal 
uncertainty developed in the literature and explains the difference of our approach. Section 
4 applies the framework of all-pay auction to the procedure of decision on infringement 
when company presents economic evidence before recognition of alleged infringement. 
Section 5 discusses the implications of the analysis for the organization of administrative 
proceedings in the field of competition legislation enforcement. Section 6 concludes.
2. Indication of the problem: uncertainty about type of infringement 
in the Russian antitrust investigations
Russian competition law since its adoption in 1990 survived different waves of chang-
es and amendments, especially after 2006. One of important amendments within the 
framework of so-called “fourth antimonopoly package” was of pure procedural nature. It 
regulates the time of the announcement of infringement alleged and requires notification 
on the initiation of administrative proceedings to contain the reasons to open proceed-
ings and grounds for suspicions in competition law violation. Russian legal community 
considers this amendment as one of the most important steps forward in the process of 
improvement of the procedural rules in administrative investigation of violation of com-
petition law. 
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Under investigation of the alleged violations of art. 10 and art. 11 of the Law “On 
protection of competition” (which are substantially equivalent to 101 and 102 TFEU ar-
ticles) competition authorities (the Federal Antitrust Service, FAS hereafter, with a re-
gional subdivisions) rely on the data provided by the companies as a response to in-
formational requests. Till now, on the stage of front-line investigation, preparing data 
according to the requests of information companies did not precisely know what alleged 
infringement is. 
Absence of the information on the nature of presumed violation suppresses the in-
centives to provide economic evidence during administrative investigation. That is why 
company often responses to the informational requests of FAS formally, provides scanty 
information and makes no efforts to prepare competing economic evidence. The same 
company after receiving decision on the infringement makes any effort to prepare appeal 
at the commercial court, hires independent lawyers and economic experts (sometimes 
several consulting companies or independent experts). Delay in the production of eco-
nomic evidence cannot be explained by uncertainty about competition authority’s deci-
sion. If after company’s responses on information requests authority opens investigation, 
the probability of infringement to be found is very high — up to 90 % during last years. 
Nevertheless, during the stage of investigation (that can last up to several years) compa-
nies make significantly less effort to prepare competing economic evidence in comparison 
to the stage after infringement decision release and before filing an appeal to the commer-
cial court of the first instance (during three months only).
The main reason for asymmetry of efforts made to provide economic evidence before 
and after infringement decision is that company does not know the precise type of alleged 
infringement literally until it receives decision of the commission of competition authori-
ty responsible for investigation of the case. There are at least two fears of wasting resources 
when economic evidence is provided before formal decision. First, economic evidence 
that plays in favor of company under one type of alleged infringement may not support its 
position under another one. Second, authority can even convert the evidence presented in 
favor of company under one type of alleged violation into the evidence, which is in favor 
of infringement decision under another type of violation.Two recent cases are expository 
in that respect. 
One is the investigation against Novolipetskiy metallurgy plant (NLMK), one of the 
largest Russian steel manufacturers, in the case of prices on cold-rolled grain-oriented steel 
[Avdasheva, Tsytsulina, 2015]. During investigation most information requested was not on 
the level of delivery prices in the domestic market, but on the criteria of price differentiation 
for the groups of domestic customers. Company expected violation presumed to be the dis-
similar conditions for equivalent transactions with different trading parties that gives some 
of them competitive disadvantage (para 1 art. 10, subpara 6, 8 of the Law “On protection of 
competition”). However, the decision issued was on excessive selling prices (para 1 art. 10, 
subpara 1). Economic evidence that company should present in her favor according two 
different types of violation differs. To disprove offense in dissimilar condition to equivalent 
transaction (discrimination) it is necessary to explain the reason for the differentiation of 
contract terms. To disprove offense in excessive pricing according to Russian Law On com-
petition it is necessary to perform comparison of price level under consideration with the 
prices on comparable competitive markets with similar demand and supply conditions, and 
with “economically reasonable” costs and profit (art. 6 of the Law “On protection of compe-
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tition”). All efforts to present economic evidence on the first issue are useless for company 
that tries to prove that price in the domestic market is not excessive. 
In the second case the three largest Russian retailers specialized in computers and 
home electronics (Eldorado, Media Markt and Auchan) were under investigation of 
the complaint of domestic producer of home electronics. Information requests during 
investigation were devoted mostly to the explanations of business practice generally 
known as slotting allowances (marketing payments of supplier to retailers, all-quantity 
discounts, after-sales rebates, and payment delays) together with best-price require-
ments. Companies reasonably expected infringement decision to be in abuse of collec-
tive dominance in the form of making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance 
by the other parties of supplementary obligations (para 1 art. 10 subpara 3). Substantial 
part of economic evidence provided to the authorities concentrates on the point that 
slotting allowances became normal part of business practice all over the world, includ-
ing Russian retail chains. Finally, infringement decision issued was on concerted practice 
(para 1 art. 11 subpara 1). Appealing (successfully at the end) the infringement decision 
in the commercial court companies provided the explanations that the structure and or-
ganization of the market of computer appliances and home electronics retailing do not 
support tacit collusion, and contract terms in question cannot be convincing evidence 
for concerted practice. In other words, only after receiving final infringement decisions 
companies start to present evidence exactly from the point they prepared on the stage 
of investigation. 
The second case is probably the only example when companies sure that they are un-
der investigation of abuse of dominance, receive infringement decision on concerted prac-
tice (that is investigation opened under one particular article of competition law results in 
infringement decision under another article). However, the companies sure that they are 
under investigation of abuse of dominance but not sure in the type of abuse of dominance, 
are not rare case in the Russian competition law enforcement. Keeping in mind that there 
are more than 3 thousand cases under investigation of abuse of dominance in Russia an-
nually (see [Avdasheva, Golovanova, Katsoulacos, 2018]), it is not surprising that uncer-
tainty about type of infringement attracts attention of legal and economic experts as well 
market participants. 
Recently there were several attempts to improve the procedures of antitrust investiga-
tion in order to resolve the problem. The first proposal is to introduce in the administra-
tive procedures an analogue of the Statement of Objection that authority should issue on 
relatively early stages of investigation. Recently exactly this amendment was under con-
sideration of the Russian Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament). The second 
proposal is the precise specification of the types of violation of competition law. Until 
now up to half of infringement decisions of the Russian competition authorities under 
art. 10 do not specify types of violations in terms of paragraphs of the article. In January 
2015, Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation considered (and rejected) the re-
quest about the ‘incompleteness’ of this article of the Law “On protection of competition”. 
We do not want to discuss this decision. Just as a remark, we consider domestic debate on 
the (in)completeness of the description of the types and indicators of violation to take the 
wrong path. Forms of restrictions of competition cannot be described perfectly anyway, 
more important task is to develop clear standards of proof for specific cases and clear wel-
fare standards of antitrust enforcement.
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However, all these developments indicate comparative disadvantage of the company 
in the process of producing economic evidence under antitrust investigation. Disadvan-
tage is not only painful for the alleged violator of competition law but also influence on the 
incentives to develop economic evidence suppressing the quality of contests of evidence 
under investigation and worsening evidentiary standards for competition authority. The 
probable outcome is welfare losses. 
3. Literature review: incentives to produce evidence under inquisitorial 
enforcement and unknown subject of violation
Incentives to provide evidence are of primary importance for the accuracy of the 
adjudication [Kaplow, 2015] that is critical for deterrence and welfare effects of enforce-
ment [Kaplow, 1994]. Incentives to provide evidence are extensively studied to analyze the 
merits of different rules in the legal disputes, for example, impact of different fee-shifting 
rules [Baye, Kovenock, de Vries, 2005] on the amount of evidence presented by parties and 
outcomes of litigation. Following Tullock [Tullock, 1975] this approach uses the model of 
all-pay auction to explain the impact of different procedural rules. We do the same, but ap-
ply all-pay auction framework to explain the effects of procedural rules in administrative 
enforcement that is inquisitorial in nature, in contrast to adversarial ones. This approach 
differentiates the presented framework from the earlier work [Avdasheva, Shastitko, 2015]. 
All-pay auction framework may seem inapplicable to strategic interaction between 
responsible authority and the suspect for the enforcement of what is called public law — 
legal rules aimed to protect social welfare. Imagine however that competition authority 
decides on the case using the effect-based approach (rule-of-reason). Socially optimal 
cost of competition authority on collecting the evidence against the company is up to the 
prevented loss of consumer welfare (or social welfare, depending on welfare standard ap-
plied).In turn, cost of company on providing evidence is up to the welfare gains produced 
by business practice in question. Presentation and cross-examination of evidence in the 
framework of effect-based enforcement of competition policy can be considered as a con-
test before competition authority.
To explain the effects of procedural rules in the framework of inquisitorial model, we 
do not consider the latter as a system where evidence in favor and against the suspect is 
collected with the same efforts, and the evidence in favor of the suspect is not rejected. In 
spite of comparative analysis of adversarial and inquisitorial law enforcement model starts 
exactly from this point [Tullock, 1988; Pozner, 1988], we claim this understanding does 
not reflect the real-life application of administrative procedures at least in some classes of 
cases. Ideally, inspection is aimed at collecting information objectively, freeing the sus-
pects from the burden of proof of innocence. However, real-life inspected company bears 
the cost of proving innocence. 
The most important effect of the low incentives to provide information is the increas-
ing probability of legal errors. Particularly, low incentives to provide information on the 
side of alleged infringer increase the probability of wrongful convictions, or Type I legal 
errors, which decreases deterrence effect of law enforcement [Gravelle, Garoupa, 2002; 
Polinsky, Shavell, 2000; Rizzolli, Stanca, 2012; Garoupa, Rizzolli, Rizzolli, Saraceno, 2013]. 
In competition policy, weaknesses of administrative enforcement that is based on in-
quisitorial model of enforcement is discussed on the example of the decisions of European 
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Commission. However, typically authors consider the very combination of investigatory, 
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions as an explanation of prosecutorial bias that limits 
the legitimacy of the decisions of competition authority [Wils, 2004]. Wils mentions three 
roots of prosecutorial bias, from which two are of mostly psychological nature (confirma-
tion bias and hindsight bias), and one results from motivation of the authority (desire to 
show a high level of enforcement activity). Difference between observations of Wils and 
our framework is that we do not presume prosecutorial bias in the decision. We allow even 
no prosecutorial bias within the authority. Infringement decision results not from pros-
ecutorial bias itself but from the little amount of evidence in favor of company. In turn, 
little amount of evidence results from the rules of sequential presentation of evidence that 
depreciate the value of information produced by company.
Our framework develops the notion of “procedural fairness” under administrative 
adjudication. Procedural fairness substantially influences the assessment of legitimacy of 
particular legal rules [Murphy et al., 2009]. In relatively young administrative jurisdictions 
the issue of procedural fairness is even more important [Deng, 2016]. In Russia specifically, 
unclear procedures and the absence of procedural fairness under administrative inspec-
tions explain large part of “barriers for business survival” [Aidis, Adachi, 2007].
4. Choice of the evidence presented under sequential decisions:
an illustration
4.1. Basic assumptions
To analyze the impact of sequencing the evidence provision and information on suspect 
violation we introduce several assumptions. First, we do not discuss legality and illegality 
per se. Actions of the suspect are considered as legal if the latter presents enough evidence in 
favor of this conclusion. Neither we discuss legal errors in spite of our framework allows for 
important implications in this respect. We assume “fair” decision-making after the parties 
present economic evidence, there is no asymmetric allocation of the burden of proof.
We consider the following model of quasi-litigation within authority responsible for 
control and monitoring. Authority (A) asks suspect that is company (C) to present evi-
dence on certain aspects of its activity. After C presents the evidence A decides on the in-
fringement alleged and amount of evidence presented from his side. In case when author-
ity waives from announcing infringement decision, it can present no evidence. 
Value for the authority to prove infringement (vA) and value for the company to dis-
prove the infringement (vC) are private values. Following tradition of modeling incentives 
of the parties in litigation [Baye, Kovenock, de Vries, 2005] let payoff of the partyUi (i, 
j = A, C) depend on the decision (infringement is found or not) and quality of economic 
evidence presented. Quality of economic evidence positively and monotonically depends 
on the cost of “evidence production” (i ie c ); 



0i
ic
, , , i j A C . If infringement is 
found authority obtains UA = vA – cA and company obtains UC = –cC, otherwise (if infringe-
ment is disproved), the parties obtain UA = –cA and UC = vC – cC respectively. For the sake of 
simplicity, in further analysis we assume that one unit of cost results in one unit of evidence.
We do not discuss the origin of vA and vC in details. Value of “not to be foundin-
fringer” for the company can be understood as avoided penalties and burden of remedies 
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as well as loss of infringement. Value of “to find infringement” for the authority generally 
depends on the incentives it faces. Following the tradition of thinking about the incen-
tives of the bureaucrats, we can imagine vA being a weighted average of social welfare loss 
avoided by finding infringement and imposing remedies and individual payoff to the au-
thority, which depends on the compensation and incentive scheme used. In extreme case, 
we can consider value of a case as contribution to the performance of authority. The latter 
particularly corresponds to the performance measurement that use “enforcement success” 
(share of infringement decisions either do not appealed or upheld by the courts). In the 
systems of performance measurement, indicators of enforcement success are not excep-
tion (see [Avdasheva, Golovanova, Katsoulacos, 2018] for the overview). 
We assume that after parties present evidence authority decides on the case, and the 
decision depends on the amount of economic evidence presented.
If two parties present evidence of equal quality, probability of winning for every party 
is 1/2. 
Therefore the pay-offs for the parties are: 
 
   
, ,    
2
   
i i i j
i
i i j i i i j
i i j
v c if e e
v
U e e v c if e e
c if e e
 

  

  .
In other words, the administrative case under some circumstances represents a kind 
of all-pay auction, traditionally used to explain effects of different litigation rules, includ-
ing fee-shifting and allocation of burden of proof. Decision process is ‘fair’ in the sense 
that we do not introduce any presumption reflected asymmetry in cost of providing evi-
dence by authority and company.
4.2. “Second-move” type interaction 
In contrast to traditional analysis of litigation as FPSB (first price sealed-bid auction) 
the procedure of decision-making on infringement according to the procedural rules ap-
plied in the enforcement agencies in Russia, is better described by the “English-type” or 
“second-price” all-pay auction. 
The order of decision-making is not that authority and suspect produce evidence si-
multaneously and independently. Instead authority asks potential infringer to present evi-
dence and then decides to produce evidence in favor of infringement decision including 
the type of infringementor to refrain from opening the formal stage of investigation. In 
other words, suspect produces evidence without knowing the precise type of infringement 
alleged. Instead, authority decides on the infringement alleged after receiving economic 
evidence provided by company and before producing its own version of evidence, and/or 
borrowing the evidence from the information of the suspect. 
Let’s show that this procedural rule at the same time disincentives companies to pro-
duce evidence and force companies to produce more evidence if they decide to do that, in 
contrast to benchmark case when first alleged infringement is announced to the parties 
and then parties simultaneously and independently produce evidence. 
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4.3. Incentives to provide evidence under diff erent regimes
of the choice of alleged infringement
Let us start with the case when there is only one type of alleged infringement. Assume 
uniform distribution of ‘value of a case’ for responsible agency and company on the in-
tervals  [0; ]Av and[0; ]cv respectively. Last move advantage allows the agency to ‘overbid’ 
the evidence presented by company if agency’s valuation of case exceeds cost of producing 
evidence (recall that they are symmetric for the parties) vA > cA, presentation of evidence 
of ‘higher quality’ in this case increases the agency’s utility. Both parties maximize net 
gains as a difference between value of the case and cost on information presented. 
Proposition 1. Under sequential presentation of information, company that decides 
first may spend on evidence less or more, but agency always spends less then under simul-
taneous decisions. 
Proof. For the company the probability to win the case depends on the cost of pro-
ducing evidence(
A
Cc
V
)and expected payoff is
       1   1C C CC C C C C
A A A
c c v
EU c v c c c
v v v
 
      
 
  

 
 


,
which is increasing in сС and strictly positive if C Av v . Expected utility is positive if 
company’s assessment of value of the case exceeds Av  and negative otherwise. 
In Nash equilibrium C Ac v , 0Ac  if C Av v and 0Cc  , Ac    otherwise. 
It is enough for agency to provide very small evidence if company refrains from pro-
ducing evidence. 
Under the assumptions made on the distribution of valuations but under adver-
sarial procedure cost on production of evidence by the both parties should be posi-
tive, and correspond to equilibrium bidding in all-pay auction with incomplete infor-
mation and asymmetric bidders [Amann, Leininger, 1996]. Recall that in the bench-
mark case under simultaneous presentation of evidence equilibrium combination of 
evidence presented is 
2
2
C
C
v
c  , 
2
2
a
A
v
c  . In the equilibrium under simultaneous
presentation of evidence the winning party is the same as under sequential presenta-
tion, but there is no possibility to win presenting marginally small amount of evidence. 
Important implication of the equilibrium bidding in incomplete information all-pay 
auctions is not only that company spends less to win the case (more precisely, whatever the 
asymmetry between parties is, in the all-pay auctions with incomplete informationrisk 
neutral party with high valuation never bids more than half of his valuation),but also that 
it is worth for the company to spend on production of evidence even if agency’s valuation 
of case exceeds those of company. 
From the proposition two lemma follows. 
Lemma 1. If there are n ≥ 2 possible violations to be established, necessary amount 
of information produced by the company to win is multiplied by the number of possible 
descriptions of violations. 
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Proof. Assume that agency can produce evidence under n alternative alleged infringe-
ments with the same cost function. Agency selects the type of alleged infringements after 
it receives evidence from company. Under the rules described above two equilibria still 
exist but for the company cost of producing evidence, if it decides to produce any, at least 
doubles. Intuition is straightforward: probability to win the case is defined by the lowest 
amount of evidence produced in favor of defendant among all potential infringements. 
To ‘beat’ the evidence presented with lower cost agency chooses the type of infringement 
with lower ec. 
Expected payoff for the company changes as follows: 
       1   1 .C C CC C C C C
A A A
c c v
EU c v c c c
nv nv nv
 
      
 


 



Accordingly, the equilibrium is cC = nvA , cA = 0 if vC = nvA , and cC = 0, cA = ε otherwise. 
As in the case described above, agency produces zero or close to zero amount of evidence 
anyway. Company overspends on production of evidence not only in comparison to the 
benchmark case of simultaneous decisions, but also in comparison to the case of the only 
possible alleged infringement. 
Lemma 2. Multiplicity of possible violations n ≥ 2 there is a possibility to convert evi-
dence in favor of company (alleged infringer) in the evidence against company (in favor of 
infringement decision) increases the amount of evidence necessary to disprove violation.
Proof. Assume that in addition to the opportunity to decide on the alleged infringe-
ment ex-post agency can convert part of evidence produced in favor of company to the 
evidence in favor of one of the possible infringements. Assume that α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1)  is the rate 
of ‘conversion’ of the evidence in favor of alleged infringer to the evidence against alleged 
infringer. There are k = 1, … , n possible infringements. Agency first inspects the evidence 
presented by company, then chooses the alleged infringement and one of the potential in-
fringements from available options with the highest α, cost function of the agency changes 
as follows: 
    , A kA A kA mCc e c e c m k   
Possibility to “convert” evidence reduces the probability to win the case for the com-
pany under given amount of evidence presented. Every unit of spending results in the 
lower increase of the probability to win the case, and expected payoff changes: 
(1– ) (1 – ) (1– )
( ) ( – ) 1– (– ) – 1 .C C CC C C C C
A A A
c c v
EU c v c c c
nv nv nv
     
        
   
Accordingly, the equilibrium is 
1C A
nc v



, if 0
1A C A
nc v v

 

, and 0Cc  , 
Ac   otherwise. Authority again produces zero or close to zero amount of evidence 
anyway. “Overspending” of company increases with the rate of evidence conversion α. 
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5. Importance of procedural rules on the order of information provision 
in administrative adjudication
Though very simple, the framework allows for welfare implications. “Procedural 
freedom” of inspecting agency and corresponding uncertainty about alleged infringement 
suppress incentives to provide evidence and discover facts for both sides — responsible 
authority and alleged infringer. Due to rules of the game, company either refrains from 
producing evidence at all, and authority correspondingly reduces cost on production of 
evidence to the minimum, or produces evidence at the costs that marginally exceed the 
value of a case for responsible authority.
Seemingly the rules of sequential presentation of information allow to decrease the 
costs of evidence collection by the authority. If companies are reluctant to produce rea-
sonable amount of evidence, it has two effects: first, authority does not have to provide 
adequate amount of competing evidence in order to win the case, and second, authority 
cannot discuss the evidence presented by the parties.Here we might find elements trans-
mission mechanisms to another type of legal uncertainty (mentioned above) and, corre-
spondingly, to errors of I type especially. Since information is necessary for the assessment 
of particular conduct, low incentives to present evidence result in the increasing probabil-
ity of legal errors that limits deterrence effect of law enforcement. 
In the case of Russian model of “late choice of infringement” explains uneven alloca-
tion of companies’ effort to produce evidence between administrative investigation stage 
and commercial court litigation stage. In contrast to administrative investigation under 
appeal procedure, party knows infringement precisely and can produce evidence without 
“overspending”. Model also explains combination of large share of infringement decisions 
in the administrative investigations (for instance, about 80–90 % recently in Russian com-
petition authority), large share of appeals to commercial court of infringement decisions 
(about 1/3 of all infringement decisions under art. 10 and 11), and relatively large share 
of infringement decisions reversed by commercial courts (about 1/4 of all appealing deci-
sions). Important part of the story is not that responsible commission cannot assess the 
evidence presented by company, but that companies prefer not to produce evidence at the 
stage of administrative investigation. Finally, model explains relatively weak economic 
evidence in the antitrust investigations [Girgenson, Numerova, 2012]. 
The model also allows to get important policy implications. “Late choice” of type of 
violation undermines one of fundamental rights — the right on defense — if we include 
in the concept of right for defense the right of the party to defend itself with reasonable 
cost. This requires several important institutional arrangements. First of all, it is neces-
sary to prescribe time of provision the information on alleged violation to the suspect. 
We cannot assess the appreciation of participants of the European competition enforce-
ment of the rules on the Statement of Objection. However Russian experience stresses 
its importance.
Many discussions on legal developments are centered on the allocation of burden 
of proof between parties in the antitrust investigations and decisions. Our model shows 
that specific order of evidence presentation and infringement formulation can deteriorate 
party’s position even under symmetric allocation of burden of proof, or, in other words, 
under no prosecutorial bias. Therefore, rules on sequence of presentation evidence are 
crucial to support de-facto equality of rights under administrative adjudication. 
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Finally, our analysis highlights crucial condition for the success of the model of sepa-
ration investigatory and quasi-judiciary units within the agency. According to our model 
this separation can be successful only if there is relatively large time gap between infor-
mational requests of investigator, announcement of alleged violation and the decision-
making process, in order to allow the company to produce relevant amount of evidence 
specifically to that stage. 
6. Conclusion
In the article we attract attention to the sequence of information provision and deci-
sion making as a source of disincentive for the object of investigation to present evidence 
unless she is not aware about the character of suspected law violation. On the regular 
basis this problem arises under administrative investigations. If responsible authority may 
announce (in some sense, may select) the content of alleged infringement after company 
discovers all information and present evidence, this step can substantially depreciate evi-
dence as a proof. The effect of depreciation arises simply because authority decides on the 
amount of evidence produced after the company under investigation presents the evi-
dence. In the equilibrium, infringement decisions are reached under zero costs of agency 
on evidence because alleged infringer spend zero on the evidence presentation. For the 
alleged infringement to be disproved, target of investigation should spend more than un-
der simultaneous presentation of evidence. Necessary costs on evidence increases with 
the number of possible qualifications of violation and the share of evidence in favor of 
alleged violation that can be interpreted against the alleged violator under one of possible 
qualification of infringements.
Effect of evidence depreciation is sufficient to explain the reluctance of the targets of 
administrative investigations to produce evidence together with little evidence produced 
by the responsible agency to support infringement decision. Observation that the same 
parties, and especially alleged infringers produce much more evidence under judicial re-
view, supports the framework developed. It means that prosecutorial bias or asymmetric 
burden of proof is not necessary to suppress the incentives of the target of investigation to 
produce evidence.
The framework draw attention to one important aspect of procedural unfairness un-
der administrative adjudication that increases the probability of wrongful conviction and 
therefore limits the deterrence of the legal rules. 
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Обесценивание свидетельств в административных разбирательствах: 
о регламентации последовательности обвинения и представления доказательств*
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Поздний выбор регулятором предмета обвинения в рамках административного рассле-
дования, когда компания (предполагаемый нарушитель) представляет сначала доказа-
тельства, затем регулятор принимает решение о предмете обвинения на основе свиде-
тельств, представленных компанией, обусловливает значительный эффект на стороне 
стимулов. Такая практика демотивирует подозреваемых представлять свидетельства 
в рамках административной процедуры. Дополнительно, стимулы представлять дока-
зательства ограничиваются, если регулятор имеет возможность выбрать из различных 
видов нарушений, предусмотренных законом, и использовать доказательную базу, со-
бранную компанией в своих интересах как свидетельство иного типа нарушений, чем 
предполагалось на первоначальном этапе разбирательства. Временная последователь-
ность решений, когда выбор вида нарушения происходит после получения регулятором 
свидетельства от компании, сопровождается решениями о нарушении, которые затем 
оспариваются в  суде. Российский опыт антимонопольных расследований  — с  двумя 
показательными иллюстрациями (НЛМК и  крупнейшие розничные сети, торгующие 
компьютерами и  бытовой электроникой),  — демонстрирует важность для компании 
решения относительно представляемых регулятору доказательств. Стимулы представ-
ления свидетельств исследуются через призму моделей аукциона со всеобщей выплатой 
и последовательным представлением заявок. Показано, что инквизиторный уклон или 
асимметричность в распределении бремени доказательств необязательны для того, что-
бы подавить стимулы объекта расследования представлять доказательства. 
Ключевые слова: административное правоприменение,расследование, наказание, су-
дебное решение, доказательства, свидетельства.
Cтатья поступила в редакцию 02.09.2018 г. 
Статья рекомендована в печать 04.10.2018 г.
К о н т а к т н а я  и н ф о р м а ц и я :
Авдашева Светлана Борисовна —д-р экон. наук, проф.; avdash@hse.ru
Шаститко Андрей Евгеньевич — д-р экон. наук, проф.; aeshastitko@econ.msu
* Данной статьей редакция журнала открывает дискуссию относительно путей совершенство-
вания правовых норм конкурентной политики, в том числе в связи с подготовкой пятого антимоно-
польного пакета.
